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In the early hours of February 24th, 1991, after weeks of air strikes, the ground offensive
against Iraq began, resulting in Iraq's forces being routed from Kuwait in four days. 1 Not quite
twenty-five years later, such a set-piece conflict would seem to come from another time, when armies
engaged each other directly and the enemy was easily identifiable. 2 Now, instead, the United States
is engaged with allies in military operations against the self-declared Islamic State in the Middle
East, 3 a separatist conflict supported by Russian arms and troops in eastern Ukraine, 4 and other
unconventional conflicts around the globe. 5 These conflicts, prosecuted by states and non-state
actors alike, are taking place in the grey zones between international and non-international armed
conflict, raising complex questions about how the law of war should apply. 6 In addition, the advent
of new technologies and a vastly increased interconnectedness allows actors to execute non-physical
actions, working within and against cyber networks.7 The law of war and standard military doctrine
have developed over time to have primary effect on the actions of States rather than on sub-national
' Master Sergeant, United States Marine Corps. B.A., George Mason University; JD., Georgetown University Law
Center (2017). The author is grateful for the assistance of Professor James Zirkle, Georgetown Law Center, and for
the constant support of his wife, Jessica. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the United States
Government.
1
See, e.g., National Guard Bureau, The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF (Aug. 8,
2000), http://archive.defense.gov/ news/ newsarticle.aspx?id=45404.
2
See generally id. (chronicling the deployment of United States forces to the Middle East).
3
See, e.g., The Short Answer: What is Islamic State?, WALL ST.]. (Jun. 12, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
briefly/2014/06/12/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham-the-short-answer/ ("Islamic State and its Iraqi leader, Abu Bakr al
Baghdadi, primarily aims [sic] to establish a radical Sunni Islamist state in the Levant region of Syria, Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan, Cyprus and Southern Turkey.").
4
See, e.g., Lisa Ferdinando, NATO focuses on Russian Violations of Ukraine's Sovereignty, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF (Jan. 22,
2015), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id= 128017 ("NATO is focused on strategies to deal with ...
Russian aggression to its east.").
5 For an example of the number of conflicts around the world, see Linda Koffmar, Two Out ofFive war Fatalities
Occurred in Syria, UPPSALA UNIVERSITY (Jun. 12, 2014), http://www.uu.se/en/media/news/article/?id=35 l 4 (noting that
the Uppsala University Conflict Data Program judges that "[i]n 2013, there were 33 active conflicts in the world, causing
at least 25 battle-related deaths.").
6
See Laurie R. Blank, What is war: An Investigation in the wake of9/1l,107 AM.]. INT'L L. 952, 952 (2013)
("Nonetheless, definitional questions remained, particularly regarding the threshold for the application ofLOAC to
hostilities not involving a struggle between two states (so-called noninternational armed conflicts) and to the distinction
and transition between noninternational and international armed conflict.").
7
See, e.g., Trouble Shooting, THE ECONOMIST (Sep. 12, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/unitedstates/2166414 5-americas-compu ters-and-netwo rks-are-under-attack-retaliation-against-chinese-hackers (describing
Chinese cyber activities against the United States).
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groups. 8 But unconventional conflicts involving such groups are not new: the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) handed down its seminal decision on unconventional conflict, Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, almost thirty years ago. 9 The rise of cyber attacks is an expansion
of the realm of unconventional warfare. 10
As the prevailing nature of conflict has changed, doctrine and law have also changed: In
2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued interpretive guidance on
civilians who engage in combat on a recurring basis, expanding States' lawful ability to use force
against them. 11 United States military doctrine refers now to "military operations other than war"
and the "spectrum of operations" to discuss such conflicts. 12 And unconventional conflicts will
continue, because no dictator or politician will easily forget how quickly Iraq's army was expelled
from Kuwait. 13 As early as 1999, military thinkers had realized that the overwhelming conventional
superiority of the West, and of the United States in particular, would require a different approach to
conflict. 14 What would have happened, for example, if Russia had invaded the Crimean Peninsula
in the same way that Iraq had invaded Kuwait? 15 Because unconventional warfare will continue, the
international law of armed conflict (LOAC) must be prepared to adapt to address the issues that
are unique to such conflicts, including cyber attacks. In Section I, this paper will review the basic
governing documents of the LOAC, the United Nations Charter and the Geneva Conventions,
highlighting the areas where they do not adequately address unconventional conflicts. Section II will
address the individual problems posed generally by unconventional warfare tactics, and their impact
on international law, more directly. Section III will analyze the ICJ's decision in the Nicaragua case in
light of the problems of unconventional war. Section IV applies these shortcomings to cyber attacks.

8

See, e.g., GARY D. Sous, THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw IN WAR 27 (2010)
(defining LOAC as based on agreements between nations and on the practice of states).
9
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United States), 1986 I.CJ. 14 Qune 27).
10
See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7 ("If Chinese spies ... were seen planting explosives in the electric grid, uproar or
worse would ensue. Yet state-supported Chinese hackers have, officials say, been getting away with the digital equivalent
for years.").
11
See NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GurnANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 27 (2009) ("In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups
constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous function
it is to take a direct part in hostilities (continuous combat function).").
12
See generally Jennifer Morrison Taw, RAND, Planning for Military Operations Other Than Wtir: Lessons ftom US Army
Efforts, 57 (1999), and Paul Scharre, Spectrum o/What?, 2012 MILITARY REv. 73 (noting that conventional maneuver
warfare, while labeled as a major combat operation, is now only a relatively small part of operations).
13
See generally infta note 14 and accompanying text.
14
See, e.g., John Van Messel, Unrestricted Wtirfore: A Chinese Doctrine for Future Wtirfore? 1 (2005), http://www.dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509132.pdf ("In February 1999, two Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) senior Air Force
colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published Unrestricted Wtirfore. The book was written in reaction to the
stunning 1991 United States led coalition victory in the Gulf War against Iraq.").
15
See Kim Murphy, Undaunted Iraq Says It Has Annexed Kuwait, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 1990), http://articles.latimes.
com/1990-08-09/news/mn-364_l_persian-gulf; see Sergei L. Loiko, Vladimir Putin Says Crimea Is Part ofRussia
Historically and Forever, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-putin-insists-crimea20141204-story.html (noting similarities in the rhetoric employed by Iraq and Russia during the annexation of these
territories).

Vol. 6, No. 2

I. THE

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND CYBER ATTACKS

INTERNATIONAL

LAw

39

OF ARMED CoNFLICT AND !Ts APPLICATION

TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

The story of the founding of the United Nations is well known: in the waning days of
World War II, the governments of the world met to form an international system that would "save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war." 16 The United Nations Charter enshrined both
the illegality of aggression in Article 2(4) and the principle of self-defense in Article 51, outlining
a regime in which force could only legally be used in response to force. This forms the basis of the
current legal landscape, one in which the Geneva Conventions further define and limit conflicts. In
fact, "[t]he Geneva Conventions use the term armed conflict specifically to avoid the technical, legal,
and political pitfalls of the term war, a direct response to the common practice of states arguing that
LOAC did not apply in the absence of a declared war." 17 In a world where conflicts do not fit neatly
into the categories of 'international' and 'non-international' outlined in the Conventions, 18 and
perhaps do not involve physical attack, even the avoidance of the term 'war' does not eliminate legal
issues.

A. The United Nations Charter
''All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 19 So reads Article 2(4) of the United Nations
Charter, which in effect outlaws the use of force "to effect changes, and ... to avoid changes in the
patterns of power and other value allocation among the various nation-states." 20 In concert with this
prohibition against the threat or use of force for political ends in Article 2(4), the Charter's Article 51
reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in ... self-defence shall ... not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
16

U.N. Charter pmbl, para. 1.
Blank, supra note 6 at 952.
18
See ICRC, How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law? 1 (2008), https://www.icrc.
org/eng/assets/files/ other/ opinion-paper-armed-conflict. pdf (stating that an international armed conflict "occurs when
one or more States have recourse to armed force against another State, regardless of the reasons or the intensity of this
confrontation," and that an armed conflict not of an international character shall "include armed conflicts in which
one or more non-governmental armed groups are involved. Depending on the situation, hostilities may occur between
governmental armed forces and non-governmental armed groups or between such groups only." It is into these two
categories that the gamut of unconventional conflicts must be shoehorned).
19
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
20
MYRES s. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 129 (1961).
17
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to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security. 21
These two articles together form the basis of the modern LOAC regime. Still, the ability
of States and non-state actors to skirt the lines laid out by these two articles can strip them of their
apparent strength. There is uncertainty surrounding what constitutes an armed attack, and when
force may be used short of threatening the political independence of a State. In its ruling in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, the I CJ stated that irregular troops could still be
considered to have launched an armed attack if the attack "would have been classified as an armed
attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces." 22
While helpfully including irregular or unconventional uses of force within the scope of Article 2(4),
the court's statement does not clarify the differences between a "mere frontier incident" and an actual
attack. Arguments that Article 2(4) bans the use of any force outside of self-defense by rendering
it inconsistent to the purposes of the Charter or defining it as a violation of a member's territorial
integrity23 do little to address the ambiguities highlighted in the ICJ's ruling. According to the ICJ,
frontier incidents, whether prosecuted by conventional or unconventional means, do not rise to the
level of an armed attack; neither does "the provision of weapons or logistical or other support." 24 The
ICJ ruled further, in the Case Concerning Oil Platforms, that "a series of ... missile attacks against
United States flag and other non-belligerent vessels" 25 did not "constitute an armed attack on the
United States." 26 Perhaps the only working definition of armed attack would parallel Justice Stewart's
famous statement in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 27 we will know it when we see it.
Article 51 preserves the inherent right of self-defense in the face of an attack. Setting aside
the issues discussed above with determining what, exactly, constitutes an armed attack is, questions
still remain concerning how imminent an attack must be and what constitutes an appropriate
response. The paradigmatic language of self-defense comes from the Caroline affair and United
States Secretary of State Daniel Webster's letter stating that the circumstances giving rise to the
use of force must be overwhelming and leave no choice of means or time for deliberation. 28 The
ICJ understanding on state actions is shaped by the Oil Platforms judgment that the United States'
attacks upon Iranian oil platforms were not self-defense, 29 as well as an advisory opinion that Israel's

21

U.N. Charter art. 51.
Nicar. v. United States, 1986 I.CJ. 14 at~ 195.
23
See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAw IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 112-13 (1991) (recognizing that such
an overly broad reading, however, could easily extend to sanctions enforced through embargoes and interdictions,
humanitarian interventions, and security operations in areas where government rule has completely failed).
24
Nicar. v. United States, 1986 I.CJ. 14 at~ 195.
25
Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), 2003 I.CJ. 161 ~ 48 (Nov. 6).
26
Id. at ~ 64.
27
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,]., concurring).
28
See British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1842d.asp.
29
Iran v. United States, 2003 I.CJ. 161 at~ 76 ("[T]he Court finds itself unable to hold that the attacks made on the
platforms could have been justified as acts of self-defence.").
22
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construction of a wall in occupied territory is contrary to international law. 30 These rulings highlight
that modern deliberations over the legitimate use of force in self-defense focus on Webster's criteria
that the threat be instant and overwhelming, which the ICJ termed in the Oil Platforms case the
"criteria of necessity and proportionality." 31
Considering the Charter's Article 2(4) and 51 regime, armed groups (whether state or nonstate) may engage in unconventional armed attacks, including cyber attacks, specifically to take
advantage of the grey areas within international law, thereby limiting the means for response from
the international community. Iraqi armored units crossing the border into Kuwait in 1990 resulted
in swift action from the Security Council. 32 In comparison, Iran's involvement in ongoing conflicts
throughout the Middle East draws a subdued reaction from the international community. 33 Cyber
attacks against Iran's nuclear program34 and massive acts of electronic espionage35 similarly fails to
inspire a vehement reaction. Even Russia, which possesses a veto on Security Council action that
may be taken against it, has chosen to engage in unconventional operations in Ukraine, softening the
resolve of other nations to impose harsh sanctions and undermining the political will of other States
to join Ukraine in collective defense. 36 The Charter's regime against the use of force is well suited to
preventing and responding to conventional military attacks, but does not provide easy answers for
unconventional warfare.

B. The Geneva Conventions
The main treaties governing the conduct of armed conflict are the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols, which are primarily concerned with the treatment of combatants. 37
The four Conventions feature articles common to each; these common articles define two types of
conflict: international conflict, defined in common Article 2 as conflict between two or more States, 38
See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.CJ. 136, ~ 142
(Jul. 9) ("Israel cannot rely on a right of self-defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of
the construction of the wall.").
31
Iran v. United States, 2003 I.CJ. 161 at~~ 73-77.
32
See S.C Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990), S.C Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990), and
U.N. S. C Res. 662, U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990) (condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanding an
immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal, and imposing sanctions upon Iraq when it failed to comply).
33
See, e.g., Frederick W Kagan et al., Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan 9, INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF WAR (2012), http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-influence-levant-egypt-iraq-and-afghanistan.
34
See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7 ("Stuxnet [was] a piece of malicious software that America and Israel used to
destroy Iran's nuclear centrifuges.").
35
See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 7 ("[H]ackers had stolen records of around 22m federal government employees from
the sleepy and ill-run Office of Personnel Management.").
36
See, e.g., NATO Expresses Concern After Report OfNew Russian Military Base Near Ukraine, RAmo FREE EUROPE/
RAmo LIBERTY (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-military-base-near-ukraine/27236785.html ("Russia
denies directly sending soldiers to fight in eastern Ukraine ... But with little fear of more serious Western reprisals ...
Russian President Vladimir Putin is being more brazen now.").
37
See Sous, supra note 8, at 186 ("Individual status [of a combatant] determines the rights and protections afforded to
a fighter.").
38
See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply in all cases of declared war or of any other armed
30
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and non-international conflict, defined in Common Article 3 by the negative to Common Article
2, that is, as an "armed conflict not of an international character." 39 The first Convention, dealing
with wounded and sick members of the armed forces in international conflicts, defines belligerents
in varying terms, from regular members of the armed forces through those who "spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces ... provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and
customs of war." 40 These categories of belligerents are entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status under
the third Convention. 41 These belligerents are also defined in the 1977 Additional Protocol I as
combatants, and shall be held if captured as POWs. 42
And what of the status of the combatants, regular or irregular, in non-international conflicts?
As Gary Solis points out in considering the rules governing of such unconventional conflicts,
The traditional view is that, just as there are no POWs in non-international armed
conflicts, there are no "combatants,'' lawful or otherwise, in common Article 3 conflicts.
There may be combat in the literal sense, but in terms of LOAC there are fighters,
rebels, insurgents, or guerillas who engage in armed conflict, and there are government
forces .... There are no combatants as that term is used in customary law of war,
however. Upon capture such fighters are simply prisoners of the detaining government;
they are criminals to be prosecuted for their unlawful acts, either by a military court or
under the domestic law of the capturing state. 43
In unconventional warfare, then, with its hybrid nature, many belligerents are not legally
considered protected combatants. At the same time, such belligerents cannot "enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations,'' as stated in the 1977 Additional
Protocol, 44 because such protection extends only "unless and for such time as [the civilians] take a
direct part in hostilities." 45
The Conventions and Additional Protocols were laid out to define who could lawfully
participate in armed conflicts, and what kinds of protections and treatments those participants
should have when placed hors de combat, either through injury or capture. 46 They were also intended
to define a basic set of protections for the civilian populaces directly affected by armed conflict, to

conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them.").
39
Id. art. 3.
40
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
41
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135.
42
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 43-44, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]
(defining combatants and the requirement to make them prisoners of war if captured).
43
Sous, supra note 8, at 191.
44
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 42, at art. 51.
45

Id.

46

See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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lessen their hardships. 47 But in the realm of unconventional warfare, where armed groups deliberately
avoid placing themselves neatly into combatant or non-combatant groups, where fighters may
not be regular members of a State's armed forces or disguised, where attacks may take place in the
electronic realm, and where any States involved are themselves seeking to avoid direct identification
of their roles in the conflict, 48 the categories and protections established by the Conventions and the
Additional Protocols limit the ability of belligerent States and the international community to fit
squarely within the laws of armed conflict. Just as utilizing unconventional warfare allows States and
armed groups to escape certain responsibilities imposed by the international community, avoiding
the employment of conventional armed forces allows groups to skirt the customs of the laws of war,
or use them to their own advantage. 49

II. PROBLEMS WITH UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Because it takes many different forms and has multiple, shifting details, unconventional
warfare goes by many different names. 50 The difficulties associated with a functional definition
of these conflicts reflect the issues that international law confronts when trying to deal with them
- if the international community cannot agree on a definition of "terrorism,'' for example, how
can it create an effective legal regime to deter terrorism? 51 Additionally, groups may attempt to
sway opinion by carefully choosing the terms describing a conflict to justify it to the international
community and lessen the undesirable repercussions of their actions. Russia attempted to justify its
invasion and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 by comparing it to Kosovo's declaration
of independence from Serbia. 52 The various shades of grey involved in unconventional conflict give
47
48

See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, supra note 38.
See, e.g., William Taylor et al., Don't Forget Crimea, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/

opinion/dont-forget-crimea.html?_r=O ("After former President Victor Yanukovych fled Ukraine ... Russia moved with
stunning swiftness in Crimea. "Little green men'' - the Ukrainians' term for soldiers without identifying insignia, later
confirmed by President Vladimir Putin to have been Russian military personnel - quickly occupied strategic points on
the peninsula. Days after a hastily organized and flawed referendum produced dubious results, Russia formally annexed
Crimea.").
49
See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 2007 I.CJ. 43
(Feb. 26), ~ 413 ("[l]t has not been established that those massacres were committed on the instructions of or under the
direction of organs of the respondent State, nor that the Respondent exercised effective control over the operations in the
course of which those massacres ... were perpetrated.").
50
See William Stevenson et al., Irregular Warfare: Everything Yet Nothing, SMALL WARS]. 2 (Dec. 16, 2008), http://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl!art/irregular-warfare-everything-yet-nothing (listing various names for unconventional
warfare, including: asymmetric warfare, guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflict, insurgency, war within a population, and
fourth generation warfare).
51
See, e.g., the UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS TO COUNTER TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, http://www.
un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2015), (listing the numerous United Nations conventions on
terrorism and specific acts of terror).
52
See, e.g., Dusan Stojanovic, Putin Compares Kosovo's 2008 Independence to Russia's Annexation of Crimea; Others
Disagree, Fox (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/03/19/putin-compares-kosovo-2008independence-to-russia-annexation-crimea-others/ (quoting Russian President Vladimir Putin as saying, "In a situation
absolutely the same as the one in Crimea, they recognized Kosovo's secession from Serbia as legitimate while arguing that
no permission from a country's central authority for a unilateral declaration of independence is necessary'').

44
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rise to many issues. Three of these issues have been in existence for some time, and they apply to
cyber attacks as well: cross-border conflicts, aggressor identification, and the revolving door problem.

A. Cross-Border Conflict

A primary strength of unconventional armed groups is their ability to seek a safe haven across
an international border, because "[t]wenty-first-century armed conflicts often have no battlefield
in the traditional sense." 53 By practicing unconventional warfare, a state-supported or non-state
armed group can keep its troops safe from harm across a border, allowing them to recuperate, train,
and plan future offenses. 54 The operations of the United States during the Vietnam War present a
textbook example of a nation utilizing conventional warfare methods struggling and failing against
an enemy utilizing unconventional warfare, particularly against the North Vietnamese use of the
borders with Laos and Cambodia, as Louis Henkin explains:
The United States saw the war [thus:] North Vietnam launched an armed attack
against the territorial integrity and political independence of an independent country,
the Republic of South Vietnam ... in clear violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. In
the face of this armed attack ... the United States could come to [South Vietnam's] aid
in collective self-defense .... The United States and the Republic of South Vietnam
had every right to carry the war to the territory of the aggressor [and] of any other
countries that involved themselves in the aggression, or permitted the aggressor to use
their territory ... i.e., Laos and Cambodia. 55
North Vietnam, however, was able to portray the conflict as a civil war, and the United
States faced significant criticism for attempting to attack belligerents who were located across
international borders from the scene of the conflict - South Vietnam. 56 In the long shadow of the
Vietnam conflict, States were loath to engage openly in operations across international borders from
53

Sous, supra note 8, at 10.
For an example of the Taliban using Pakistani territory as a refuge during the Afghanistan War see Council on Foreign
Relations, The Taliban: A CFR Info Guide Presentation (2015), http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/
taliban/p35985?cid= marketing_use-taliban_infoguide-012115#!/ ("The insurgents could not have thrived without
sanctuary in Pakistan, whose main intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi) directorate, cultivated them
in the 1990s and maintained ties to them after 2001."); see also Ismail Khan and Azam Ahmed, Pakistan Urges Afghans to
Help Find Taliban Leaders Behind Massacre, N .Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 12/18/world/
asia/pakistan-premier-lifts-death-penalty-moratorium-following-school-massacre.html?_r=O.
55 Loms HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAw AND FOREIGN Poucy 308 (1979).
56
Id. at 308 ("In such a war, United States intervention, even bombing North Vietnam, was - again - perhaps a
violation of traditional international norms against intervention .... Bombing Laos or Cambodia would be more
difficult to justify ... toleration of mutual interventions in civil war does not contemplate attacks by one intervenor
against another."); see also Henry Grabar, What the US. Bombing of Cambodia Tells Us About Obama's Drone Campaign,
THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/20 l 3/02/what-the-us-bombing-ofcambodia-tells-us-about-obamas-drone-campaign/273142 ("Like the current conflict, the military action in neutral
Cambodia was so secretive that information about the first four years of bombing, from 1965 to 1969, was not made
public until 2000. And like the current conflict, the operation in Cambodia stood on questionable legal ground.").
54
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the location of a conflict; a situation perhaps reinforced by the experience of the United States over
the last fifteen years: "The American debacle in Iraq seemingly vindicates the restrictive use-of-force
doctrine [that] called for the last-resort application of overwhelming force on behalf of vital interests
and clearly defined and achievable political-military objectives." 57 Objectives can only be clearly
defined and achievable if the battlefield is limited in geographic scope. It is possible, however, that
technological advances will alter this hesitancy, as nations are able to strike their enemies from across
the globe utilizing relatively limited resources and at little to no risk of combat losses. 58 The ability
to inflict damage on an adversary without leaving the office, let alone dispatching troops, can only
increase the frequency of attacks. The global connectivity created by the World Wide Web means
that almost all cyber attacks will be cross-border in nature. 59
Of course, such conflicts involving the United States which "fail to fit nicely within the[]
two dominant categories" have always been present; notably, the Boxer Rebellion in China; the 1916
United States punitive raid against Pancho Villa in Mexico; and the United States intervention in the
Russian Civil War. 60 International law has yet to account for the increased geographic scope of armed
conflict, so that LOAC and human rights law can be facilitated. Typically, the enemy "deliberately
avoids consolidating its center of gravity in such hot zones [of conflict], but instead operates out
of whatever safe haven offers the best opportunity for protection from the reach of state military
capabilities."6 1 Unconventional armed conflict has shifted away from the relatively simple situation
of an armed group seeking safe haven across a border from the conflict zone, and has become a much
more complex trans-national situation in which groups seek to plan and launch physical and cyber
attacks from relatively safe locations. 62 The nature of cyber attacks exploits the problems posed by
safe havens and cross-border conflicts; aggressors will continue to favor them as long as they remain
low-risk. Proliferation of multi-national cyber attacks as part of unconventional warfare can only be
addressed by an international legal regime governing trans-national conflict.

B. Aggressor Identification
A key point within LOAC's regime to limit armed conflict is the punishment of aggression.
In the aftermath of World War II, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined crimes
against peace as the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression,'' 63 setting the
57
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stage for placing aggressive action by States in the realm of war crimes. Article 2(4) of the Charter
forbids "the threat or use of force,'' 64 and the United Nations General Assembly attempted to define
aggression by adopting Resolution 3314. 65 In the strictest terms, then, the international legal regime
has defined aggression and made it illegal.
Yet, armed groups use the shadows of unconventional warfare to disguise their acts of
aggression, avoiding the direct action response to a conventional invasion such as Iraq's action against
Kuwait. 66 Discussing the current international legal system's problems in coming to grips with the
issue of aggressive unconventional warfare, John Norton Moore points out:
[t]he central symptom of this problem in the international legal system, as it is presently
applied, is the system's all too frequent failure to systematically and strongly condemn the aggressive
use of force, particularly in the low-intensity conflict spectrum, while simultaneously and perversely
condemning and constraining the use of defensive force in response to such aggression. 67
One of the keys to unconventional warfare is that it allows belligerents to disguise themselves
and thus disguise their aggression. By swimming in the sea of the people, in Mao's phrasing, 68
belligerents can increase their survivability against conventional forces, prolong the conflict and sap
political will, create plausible deniability for outside agents and sponsors, and increase their use of
surprise and deception. They may also, as Moore points out, limit the international legal system's
sanctions against them, and perhaps see sanctions passed against their opponents' attempts at
defending themselves. 69 Moore states that, for the legal system to provide effective deterrence,
[a]gression, whether overt or covert, must be clearly condemned. Defense, whether
overt or covert, must be clearly supported and assisted. And it must be understood that
it is the difference between the systemic treatment of aggression and defense that will
largely determine whether the legal system will play a significant role in war avoidance. 70
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As previously discussed, 71 cyber attackers exploit the current regime by remaining across
borders or in other safe zones, away from the location of their target. This cross-border problem is
exacerbated by the identification problem, because the identity of a cyber attacker is exceedingly
difficult to pin down and can often not be revealed if it is known without possibly compromising
intelligence sources. 72 Cyber attacks are a paradigmatic example of aggressors disguising themselves
to avoid retaliation. One can only imagine the difficulty of attempting to conceal a conventional
force's movement across an international border, although it is not impossible to do. 73 Extending
the legal controls effective against conventional warfare to unconventional warfare and cyber attacks
will lessen groups' reliance on the protections provided by unconventional means. The international
legal regime must strengthen existing prohibitions on the use of force and on aggression by making
explicit that unconventional means of waging such war will be dealt with in the same manner as
their conventional equivalents.

C The Revolving Door Problem
Unconventional warfare often involves civilian belligerents engaging in hostilities and then
retreating from the zone of conflict across international borders. But even when they are in the zone
of conflict, belligerents often blend in with the local populace to prevent accurate identification.
They eschew identifying uniforms or insignia - in fact, as the ICRC noted in its 2008 opinion paper,
persons engaged in combat can be the armed forces of an armed group that is not a State but is a
party to the conflict. 74 But what of civilians who engage in combat, and then hide their weapons and
go home? And what of individuals who may or may not be members of a State's armed forces, but
are involved in cyber attacks and thus unidentifiable? Section 51 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I
states that civilians "shall enjoy the protections afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities." 75 This creates what is known as the revolving door problem: a
belligerent can take up arms and engage in hostilities, and then disengage and lay down their arms at
the end of the day, regaining the protections afforded to civilians under the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols. 76 Because the Conventions were aimed at restricting and controlling the
actions of conventional forces, they are ill adapted to the realities of unconventional conflict.
While the revolving door problem itself is of limited application for cyber attacks, the
international legal community's response to this shortcoming should be used as an example of
71
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effective action against a spreading threat. In May of 2009, the ICRC issued Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities. 77 The guidance determines that individuals engaged
in hostilities on a regular and recurring basis are de facto armed forces and thus lose their civilian
protections for the time that they are serving, rather than only for the period they are actively
engaged in hostilities. 78 The main passage discussing this solution to the revolving door problem,
from chapter II, section 3, "Organized Armed Groups,'' bears quoting at some length:
[T]he decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized armed group is
whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her direct
participation in hostilities (hereafter: "continuous combat function"). Continuous
combat function does not imply de Jure entitlement to combatant privilege. Rather,
it distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces of a non-state party from
civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or
unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or other noncombat functions.
Continuous combat function requires lasting integration into an organized
armed group .... Thus, individuals whose continuous function involves the preparation,
execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct participation in
hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function ....
Individuals who continuously accompany or support an organized armed
group, but whose function does not involve direct participation in hostilities, are
not members of that group .... Instead, they remain civilians .... Although such
persons may accompany organized ... and provide substantial support to a party to the
conflict, they do not assume continuous combat function and, for the purposes of the
principle of distinction, cannot be regarded as members of an organized armed group.
As civilians, they benefit from protection against direct attack unless and for such time
as they directly participate in hostilities ....
In practice, the principle of distinction must be applied based on information
which is practically available and can reasonably be regarded as reliable in the prevailing
circumstances. A continuous combat function may be openly expressed through the
carrying of uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons. Yet it may also be identified
on the basis of conclusive behaviour, for example where a person has repeatedly directly
participated in hostilities in support of an organized armed group . . . . Whatever
criteria are applied in implementing the principle of distinction in a particular context,
they must allow to reliably distinguish members of the armed forces of a non-State
party to the conflict from civilians who do not directly participate in hostilities, or who
do so on a merely spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized basis. 79
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Under this regime, a "fighter who plants improvised antipersonnel mines remains a lawful
target when he puts down his tools and walks home for lunch .... A senior terrorist insurgent may
be targeted when he is asleep. An insurgent commander remains a lawful target ... whatever he
may be doing." 80 This is a major change in LOAC, acknowledging the prevalence of belligerents
engaging in unconventional warfare while attempting to avoid the risks inherent in organizing as
an armed force. 81 Of the problems reviewed so far, this is one of the few where the international
legal community has taken action to directly address the issues that arise in unconventional warfare
situations and mitigate them. The ICRC passage on the continuous combat function concludes:
"determination [of a combatant's status] remains subject to all feasible precautions and to the
presumption of protection in case of doubt." 82 While conventional armed forces of law-abiding
nations must ensure that they are engaged in lawful targeting and err on the side of caution, the
ICRC's guidance does permit them to engage unconventional belligerents on a more equal footing.
In regards to those participating in cyber attacks, the guidance presents a stepping-stone to determine
their status as combatants. The international legal community must take more steps similar to this to
address the problems of unconventional warfare, and specifically cyber warfare.

III. THE NICARAGUA

CASE

As seen above, the ICJ has issued several rulings that bear upon unconventional warfare. In
1986 the court released its decision in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua. 83
The case was brought by Nicaragua, who charged the United States "with illegal intervention
and paramilitary activities against the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of their
state." 84 As Moore put it, the Nicaragua case was a result of the fact that "since mid-1980 Cuba and
Nicaragua have been waging a secret war against neighboring Central American states." 85 Nicaragua
(with support from Cuba and the Soviet Union) was engaged in many aspects of unconventional
warfare. The United States' response was to give "support to the contras, a term employed to
describe those fighting against the present Nicaraguan Government." 86 The United States, then,
responded to Nicaragua's unconventional warfare campaign by supporting groups waging their
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own unconventional fight.s 7 Although the United States argued that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction,
the ICJ disagreed and the case went forward, even though the United States had withdrawn before
hearings on the merits began.ss Holding that the United States had violated international law and
that Nicaragua's actions did not amount to an armed attack against El Salvador, the ICJ addressed
two of the major issues of unconventional war discussed above: cross-border conflict and aggressor
identification.s 9 Examining the ICJ's handling of these issues in this case sheds light on the problems
the international legal community faces addressing these problems; the next section will demonstrate
the relationship between unconventional warfare and cyber attacks. The discussion in the ICJ's
decision underscores the same general problems that will face a legal regime attempting to address
cyber attacks. The United States, in particular, could face difficulties similar to those it encountered
here in both international courts and the court of public opinion if it attempts to fight cyber warfare
by unconventional means of its own.

A. Cross-Border Conflict

All groups involved in the Nicaragua conflict used cross-border sanctuaries to protect their
troops: the United States kept personnel involved in training and advising the contras "on the other
side of the frontier, or in international waters." 90 The ICJ noted that contra groups operated in
Nicaragua along the borders with Honduras and Costa Rica. 91 For its part, Nicaragua was responsible
for "certain trans border military incursions into the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica ...
92
•"
The court also found "that support for the armed opposition in El Salvador from Nicaraguan
territory was a fact up to the early months of 1981." 93 However, the ICJ did not have enough
evidence to conclude that the government of Nicaragua was involved or responsible for providing
support to the insurgents in El Salvador. 94
Not only did the use of cross-border safe havens prolong the conflict, the trans-national
nature of the conflict severely hampered the ICJ's ability to ascertain how much support each side
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was giving to those groups. 95 This was no minor issue in the ICJ's decision making process: as it
pointed out, the United States would have to have needed "effective control of the military or
paramilitary operations [of the contras] in the course of which the alleged violations were committed"
to be held legally responsible - but evidence of such direct control was not forthcoming. 96 Moreover,
the ICJ noted that "if Nicaragua has been giving support to the armed opposition in El Salvador,
and if this constitutes an armed attack on El Salvador and the other appropriate conditions are met,
collective self-defence could be legally invoked by the United States." 97 Again, evidence of such
support could not be clearly established. 98 In the end, because the governments involved kept the
insurgent groups at arm's length and provided their support across international borders, the ICJ was
unable to reach any definitive decision regarding their responsibility for the conflicts in El Salvador
and Nicaragua. 99 This same problem will be faced by legal systems which seek to penalize violations
of the law of armed conflict by use of cyber attacks, with an even higher bar to proper assessment of
support from state actors.

B. Aggressor Identification

Identifying state responsibility was difficult for the ICJ because of the unconventional nature
of the conflict. Indeed, the ICJ noted at the outset of its listing of the facts in the case that,
the secrecy in which some of the conduct attributed to one or other of the Parties has
been carried on ... makes it more difficult for the Court not only to decide on the
imputability of the facts, but also to establish what are the facts. Sometimes there is
no question ... that an act was done, but there are conflicting reports, or a lack of
evidence, as to who did it. The problem is then not ... imputing the act to a particular
State for the purpose of establishing responsibility, but ... tracing material proof of the
identity of the perpetrator. 100
This statement encapsulates the problem of aggressor identification: by disguising their
involvement in the conflict, the participants could deflect any responsibility for individual acts,
even if their general participation was established. Although the United States accused Nicaragua of
providing cross-border sanctuary, communications and logistics support, supplies, and weapons, the
ICJ was unable to connect the actions of the insurgents in El Salvador with any direct support of the
Nicaraguan government. 101 Despite the massive impact of the conflict in El Salvador, which "resulted
Id. at ~~ 19-20 (analyzing the degree of support the United States provided to the contras during the revolution).
Id. at ~ 115.
97
Id. at~ 127.
98
Id. at ~ 249 ("The acts of which Nicaragua is accused, even assuming them to have been established and imputable to
that State .... ") (emphasis added).
99
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that Nicaragua was responsible for "border incursions" into Honduras and Costa Rica, the ICJ stated that it could not
determine if these amounted to armed attacks.
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allegation of the United States that the Government of Nicaragua had been engaged in the supply of arms to the armed
opposition in El Salvador only partly contradicted that allegation.").
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in thousands of war casualties and over a billion dollars in direct war damage,'' 102 it was possible
to interpret the insurgency as almost entirely self-contained. Nicaragua escaped responsibility
not because it was completely unclear if it was involved, but because it was just unclear enough
for the international community to largely ignore its involvement - a result similar to current
unconventional operations.
In fact, the ICJ was only able to assign responsibility to the United States for its support of
the contras because the United States government had, in a way, admitted to it: The United States
justified some of its actions, such as reconnaissance overflights, to the Security Council as collective
self-defense. 103 However, the ICJ refused to use the self-defense justification to concretely assign
responsibility to the United States. 104
Instead, it was the rather-public debate between President Reagan's administration and
Congress over funding for covert operations in Central America that provided evidence for the ICJ
to use in determining the United States' responsibility for the contras. 105 In the end, because of its
justification to the Security Council and the public nature of its governmental debates, the United
States was found to have violated the principle of non-intervention in another State's affairs and
the prohibition against the threat or use of force. 106 However, other States and non-state groups do
not have the handicap of public debate. Instead, they are able to mask their involvement, even if
only enough to avoid all-out condemnation by the international community. States could interpret
the ICJ's ruling that the United States committed such a violation, but that Nicaragua did not as
presenting a simple lesson: do not get caught. Avoiding such a position is much easier for actors who
are engaging in cyber operations. 107

C Armed Attacks

The ICJ's ruling also discussed the question of what constitutes an armed attack. As seen
above, the ICJ's decision held that an armed attack could be committed by unconventional troops. 108
However, the ICJ also found that" [t]here is no rule in customary international law permitting
another State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the
situation." 109 That is, a State could not declare an attack on another State and commit aggression
under the guise of collective self-defense; instead, "it is to be expected that the State for whose benefit
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this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack." 110 This is the logic
behind the ICJ's statement "that the requirement of a request [for assistance] by the State which
is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the requirement that such a State should have
declared itself to have been attacked." 111
Rather than implying that States must engage in a drawn-out declaration and notification
process, this reasoning by the ICJ is commensurate with accepted norms regarding self-defense: its
investigation looked into the timing of possible statements by El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica
that an armed attack occurred and their requests for assistance, and compared them with the timing
of the United States' actions in the region. 112 The ICJ's reasoning regarding declarations is in keeping
with the requirements of the United Nations Charter: ''Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
requires that measures taken by States in exercise of this right of self-defence must be immediately
reported to the Security Council." 113 As the Charter's reporting requirement is not construed
to restrict a State's ability to react rapidly, neither should the ICJ's attempt to find a request for
assistance be so construed; instead, the ICJ was attempting to deal with one of the main problems of
unconventional warfare: how to determine if an armed attack was occurring, and if so, when did it
begin and who initiated it? 114 While the ICJ's reasoning would be highly applicable in a conventional
setting, by veiling themselves through the use of unconventional warfare, the parties involved in
Central America were able to prevent the international legal system from correctly identifying
the aggressors and taking action to sanction them. The ICJ struggled and failed to link formal
declarations of attacks and requests for assistance with the actions of the belligerent parties. 115
This inscrutability extended to the ICJ's attempts to determine if any armed attacks had
occurred at all. The ICJ failed to find that "the provision of arms to the opposition in another State
constitutes an armed attack on that State. Even at a time when the arms flow was at its peak, and
again assuming the participation of the Nicaraguan Government, that would not constitute such
armed attack." 116 ICJ Judge Sir Robert Jennings sharply disagreed with this decision in his dissent:
It may readily be agreed that the mere provision of arms cannot be said to amount to an
armed attack. But the provision of arms may, nevertheless, be a very important element
in what might be thought to amount to armed attack .... Accordingly, it seems to me
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that to say that the provision of arms, coupled with logistical or other support is not
armed attack is going much too far .... [I]t becomes difficult to understand what it is,
short of direct attack by a State's own forces, that may not be done apparently without
a lawful response in the form of collective self-defence; nor indeed may be responded
to at all by the use of force or the threat of force. 117
The ICJ's attempts in the Nicaragua case to rule on state responsibility in an unconventional
transnational conflict highlight the weakness of the current legal regime to respond to
unconventional warfare. When confronted with belligerents whose actions, sources of support, and
even methods were all subject to question, the ICJ was incapable of drawing any strong conclusions
regarding the responsible parties and appropriate sanctions. 118 The debate over what constitutes a
cyber attack is ongoing, 119 with a primary focus on when a cyber attack amounts to an act of war - a
debate that parallels the ICJ's struggle to determine if an armed attack, within the meaning of the
Charter, had taken place.

III.

APPLYING THE LESSONS TO CYBER WARFARE

The new capabilities provided by electronic interconnections have changed the face of
unconventional warfare. What before could only be accomplished through armed troops, a complex
espionage program, or a determined propaganda effort - undermining the legitimacy of a nation's
government and committing acts of espionage and sabotage - can now conceivably be realized by
means of a relatively small, well-trained group of hackers. 120 Only a few decades ago, the theft of
millions of personnel files from the United States Office of Personnel Management would have
required a complete penetration of the agency, consuming massive resources and requiring decades of
work. 121 Today, we should expect such attacks, if not their successes, to be routine.
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A. Cross-Border Conflict and Aggressor Identification
With the advent of globalized network connections, the problems of cross-border safe havens
and unknown aggressors are intertwined and magnified. As was discussed above in Section II A,
unconventional armed forces often seek to use safe havens in other countries to bolster their strength
and security. 122 One of the major problems the ICJ faced in dealing with the Nicaragua case was that
the forces involved were operating across an international border and could not be easily identified as
agents of the Nicaraguan government. 123 Global cyber networks allow actors to commit acts of war
without ever being present at the site of the attack. Moreover, attackers can disguise their location
via proxy networks 124 and the state or non-state actors coordinating the attack can claim plausible
deniability even when confronted with evidence indicating their guilt. 125
Just as in the Nicaragua case, it is very difficult to determine if the attackers themselves are
operating at the behest of or under the protection of the government in whose territory they are
based, even if the location can be identified. 126 The ICJ did not have enough evidence before it to
determine if the government of Nicaragua was responsible for the actions of the insurgents 127 - in a
cyber attack, a court would also face the same difficulties assigning responsibility to a state, especially
because an attack need not originate in the state sponsoring it, or even in only one state. Even in a
country with a more authoritarian regime, such as Russia, it is certainly possible that a determined
group of hackers could carry out an attack without the knowledge, to say nothing of the consent,
of the government. 128 Finally, even if the location of the attack were determined, identifying the
attackers themselves is all but impossible. An attack could be traced to a certain computer, but that
does not provide evidence regarding who was at the keyboard. 129 Bringing the attackers to justice
would be an even more difficult proposition if the government protected them. Unless LOAC is
adjusted to take account of this new reality, we should expect states to more frequently engage in
cyber attacks because of the relative immunity they provide. As the world's interconnectivity grows
122
123
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and spreads beyond shopping and banking, our increased vulnerability to the effects of an attack
will only increase the likelihood that actors will choose to utilize cyber as their preferred means of
aggression. 130 The ability to act across borders and disguise identities only lend more weight to the
case for using cyber attacks as the primary means of waging unconventional war. 131 The laws of
war must take this into account, perhaps by mandating that governments, from whose territories
attacks are launched, participate in identifying attackers and bringing them to justice, or face the
presumption that the state itself is coordinating the attacks.

C Armed Attacks
An even thornier problem than identifying an attacker in cyberspace is determining whether
a cyber attack constitutes an armed attack for the purposes of LOAC. The ICJ struggled with the
question of how much intervention would amount to an act of war, discussing the issue of 'crossborder incursions' and identifying the existence of, but not the exact point, of a threshold that
must be crossed before an attack became an act of war. 132 Just as cyber attacks magnify the existing
problems of unconventional warfare, they also seemingly magnify the problem of identifying when
the threshold between skirmish and war is crossed. 133 However, it is possible that this problem is
not as vexing as it appears. If LOAC can adapt to take into account the increasing prevalence of
unconventional warfare, the issue of identifying when a cyber attack is an act of war could also be
resolved. To do so, there must be a meaningful way to distinguish between unconventional and
conventional warfare. Unconventional and conventional warfare are two means by which war may be
waged - each with distinct advantages and disadvantages. 134 Just as with other new types of weapons,
cyber attacks are not, in and of themselves, a new means or a new end. Instead, cyber attacks are
one way of waging war - a way which lends itself readily to unconventional operations. 135 The
130
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international community, and especially the legal community, should not focus on the ways or means
when attempting to determine if an attack constitutes an act of aggressive war. Rather, the focus
should be on the ends - just as acts of terrorism can be distinguished by the goals of the actor, 136 a
determination whether the threshold of war has been crossed should be made by examining the ends
sought from the attack.
For example, a cyber attack stealing thousands of sensitive documents is an act of espionage,
and not an act of war in and of itself. 137 If such an act of espionage were carried out without the use
of computers, it would not likely be seen as crossing the threshold to war unless it was part of a larger
attack. An attack that disables, even temporarily, a State's ability to utilize its nuclear arsenal would
be an act of war, because its goal is to disable a central weapons system used in the defense of the
nation. If such an attack were carried out by more traditional means, 138 it would very likely be seen as
an act of war. If the law of war is going to adjust to the new weapons and tactics that are being used,
it must produce clear guidance on determining what constitutes an act of war, and how states may
respond. Focusing on the ends sought by aggressors rather than on the ways and means they use is
one way LOAC can move forward in this regard.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The international legal system has great difficulty dealing effectively with unconventional
conflicts by applying law meant for conventional state actors. Despite attempts to adjust the
governing conventions, like the ICRC's attempt with its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect
Participation in Hostilities, the majority of LOAC is still geared toward regulating state-conducted
conventional warfare. However, as conventional war takes second place to unconventional warfare,
and non-state armed groups become increasingly more sophisticated and deadly, LOAC must
adapt. 139 The norms and standards governing state responsibility, cross-border conflict, and civilians
engaged in hostilities must be adjusted to take account of the growing prevalence of unconventional
warfare if the international legal community is to be effective. These problems are only magnified
by the increasing likelihood of cyber attacks becoming the modi operandi of choice among both
state and non-state actors. The ruling of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case highlights the difficulties
in applying the current legal regime in the face of unidentifiable aggressors and ambiguous attacks
136
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- features that cyber warfare exemplifies. As Judge Jennings stated in his dissent to the Nicaragua
decision, under the current legal regime, States are hard pressed to effectively and legally undertake
collective defense in the face of unconventional threats. Judge Jennings concluded that" [t]his looks
to me neither realistic nor just in the world where power struggles are in every continent carried
on by destabilization, interference in civil strife, comfort, aid and encouragement to rebels, and the
like." 140 The international legal community must bring the current prohibitions against aggression
clearly to bear on States and non-state actors using unconventional warfare, and especially cyber
warfare, to shield themselves from the legal repercussions of waging war.
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